So died the season for the 2011 Boston Red Sox.

It is only fitting the final miscue was made by Carl Crawford. For all of the angst that has been pouring out on the WEEI airwaves and cropping up within the blogosphere, the team had 90 wins when all was said and done. Five more wins over the course of the year would have edged out Tampa Bay.

There’s a hundred different permutations of how five more games could have been victories: more starts from Clay Buchholz, a few more productive outings from Wheeler, Jenks, and Albers, Daniel Bard not having the yips, and not falling out of the gate 2-10 would have done the job. In my completely unqualified opinion, the team doesn’t need to be blown apart beyond recognition. The talent is there. If they only won 70 games, then I would be more easily persuaded that significant roster changes are in order.

Since Andino’s bloop, Manager Terry Francona has either quit or been shown the door (depending on whom you believe). The current Boston media chatter focuses on whether General Manager Theo Epstein may elect to move to the Chicago Cubs. There has also been a minor flap about the pitchers, specifically the starters, drinking in the clubhouse on their scheduled days off.

I initially meant to draw similarities between Crawford’s failure and Aaron Boone’s 2003 ALCS-ending homer off of Tim Wakefield. The more I thought about it, the only connection was the that they were the game-losing plays of their respective seasons. Wakefield has been a valuable member of the pitching staff throughout his Boston career, whether starting, short relief, long relief, closing, mop-up… Crawford has been a pain in the rear of Boston fans throughout his Tampa Bay career, and now continues to annoy and frustrate, albeit now from the home dugout. I was initially surprised and confused by the Crawford signing, and now I hold out hope that over the life of his contract he proves to be great defensively and learns to bunt effectively.

I wish to briefly revisit Francona’s exit. As has been explained elsewhere on the internet, a baseball coach is inherently different from those in the NBA, NHL, or NFL. Baseball is largely a one-on-one contest. A manager may switch pitchers, pinch hit, realign the defenders, pinch run, and that’s about it. Very few baseball managers, if any, call for specific pitch sequences. Thus, the real onus is on the players. Not the GM, who hired the players based on their past experience, but the players. Francona nor Epstein missed that catch. Crawford missed it. The starters could not get to the seventh inning in September more often that not (if at all?).

Now, as far as the rumor of drinking in the clubhouse goes, if it is true, it is highly unprofessional, especially in the later stages of the season. In my fan opinion, it is exciting to see another starter come in from the bullpen in an elimination game. Tim Lincecum, CC Sabathia, and Max Scherzer? The sheer novelty of it, since it isn’t often done, immediately adds drama and excitement to the game. When the Boston bullpen was overburdened as much as it was during September 2011, that final game with Bedard starting absolutely should have featured Lester and Beckett in from the bullpen to get to the ninth. The season is on the line. If they are inebriated, than that must be dealt with.

But for all those seeking answers, sorting out how to restructure the roster so that next year is “the year” again… as far as my understanding goes, the worse your organization fares during the season, the better opportunity you receive in the draft. Assuming your organizational focus shifts to scouting after a few futile years, eventually the cards have been stacked in your favor to have a wave of talent come up through the system together. Boston’s problem has been it’s recent prosperity. I am not sure how the draft is structured, but if the general rule is that the better teams pick farther down in the order, then Boston has not had the chance to get the youngest, most promising talent and instead must either find the young talent that has just hit the majors (which everyone clamors for in trades) or pay dearly for the established veteran in Free Agency (Crawford and Lackey).

When going with the veterans, as the GM may have no other choice given his roster, you run into a problem that hasn’t really been talked about much, at least in the discussions I’ve overheard or read through online. The veterans have nothing left to play for but pride. If a baseball player is going to coast, they’re going to do so when they’ve secured their mountain of money for a set amount of years. If the contracts were set and more incentive based- such as only half the value is assured and the other half is based upon reaching certain performance criteria- then the players, one would assume, would maintain discipline, focus, and motivation to succeed.

Anyway, at least New York is out of it.

The 2010-11 offseason for Boston built a sense of excitement and a publicity campaign of being “all-in” centering around the trade and subsequent extention of Adrian Gonzalez and Carl Crawford. The former has graciously put up 200 hits and lead the league in batting average. Crawford… I’m too lazy right now to look up just how awful his numbers have been and contextualize them with much cheaper, easily-acquired players; perhaps in a future post…

Right now here is a list of recent missteps by Epstein. In fairness, one can only expect the GM to make the best decision with the available information at the time. If they fail to do this, then they are incompetent. Otherwise, they are simply unlucky. A countdown, from benign oversight to boneheaded foulup…

5. Adrian Gonzalez

I must be a fool to hate on a player that leads the league in batting average and puts up 200 hits. While that certainly is what you’d hope for from a hitter, the problem is that Epstein let himself get giddy.

- The spray charts from Petco Park overlapped onto Fenway promised 35-50 home runs a year; this did not happen

-Epstein both traded three of the most promising prospects in the farm system and subsequently signed the player to a deal in excess of six years and $100 million. When this upcoming offseason features Albert Pujols, Prince Fielder, and it would have had Gonzalez, Epstein effectively paid full price twice when two other viable options were possibly available. Further, to avoid looking foolish, a gentlemen’s agreement was reached for the extension before the player had regained the use of his shoulder, so Epstein would not have traded away so many pieces for a rental. What keeps this from being higher on the list is the actual production and the fact that all three prospects are still plausibly busts. Now Epstein may also be stuck with an aging player in five years with a prohibitive contract, much like our friend….

4. Carl Crawford

This didn’t make sense at the time and it really doesn’t make that much sense now. To sign a player to such a long-term, expensive deal and stick him is the smallest portion of the outfield when his bread and butter is his speed seems foolish. Crawford was supposed to team with Ellsbury to steal bases, the only problem is Crawford getting on base to begin with. However, there may be some hope of Crawford providing some insurance in case Ellsbury walks in free agency, and/or Ellsbury comes crashing back to earth after a career year. At the moment, this isn’t a good deal. However, it may prove itself useful in the future, something we hope can be said for the next fellow,

3. Clay Buchholz

After an early career no-hitter, a disastrous bouncing around between the majors and minors, and then seeming redemption from 2009 to his spectacular 2010, Buchholz missed a great deal of time in 2011 due to back trouble while I and the collective fanbase hold our breath. Can he bounce back once again next year?

Better yet, this should be Toronto’s problem right now. In 2009, if I am not mistaken, new Toronto GM Alex Anthopoulos faced with some terrible problems, chiefly: ace Roy Halladay was all but leaving in free agency, and it was best to get maximum value out of a trade.

I recall reading rumors that Buchholz was supposed to be the centerpiece of the trade, but the deal fell through due to bickering over the other parts and the fan backlash of trading within the division.

However, I’ve begun to wonder recently… AA was roundly heralded for trading Vernon Wells, an outfielder with a horrible contract, for anything worthwhile. As it turns out, Wells now plays for the Jays and that contract is off AA’s books. Did Epstein offer to take on the Wells contract to sweeten the deal? It’s a bad contract, but so is…

2. Jon Lackey

How bad? Historically bad. His ERA is the worst of any Red Sox pitcher. Ever. OK, maybe not ever, but in the past hundred years- look it up. They are paying him $82 million for five years. Roy Halladay could be in his place. Granted Wells would be the left fielder or fourth outfielder, but Halladay is worth it.

Besides, to compensate, there was this rib-kicker, the trade that never should have happened…

1. Justin Masterson and Nick Hagadone to Cleveland for Victor Martinez

This literally would not have cost a dime. It would save quite a few, actually. It would also, when coupled with the prior post, put up a rotation of:

Halladay

Lester

Beckett

Buchholz

Masterson

Matsuzaka/Wakefield/Miller/Aceves

That’s right, no Bedard, no Kyle Weiland, no Lackey. That rotation would have survived this stretch far better than the current mess. Admittedly, Buchholz and Matsuzaka would still miss the bulk of the season. Despite this, Halladay and Masterson would have eaten innings admirably, and Wake/Miller/Aceves would take turns as long-relief and spot starters. The bullpen would be much better rested. Payroll would roughly be the same, since the money for Lackey would presumably go to Halladay (whose contract ends sooner) and Bedard/Crawford are not being paid as a result.

Instead, I now root for the Giants to make the playoffs, and the Phillies if they fail. Cliff Lee, I still thank you on behalf of all of Boston baseball.